This study explains about a phenomenon where the structure of the compensation plan for a single salesperson may vary as he/she gains experience. Unlike past studies that implicitly assume the limited effect on salesperson's experience, our result predicts that a salesperson will make an effort at every period early in his/her career without any commissions in order to gain experience. However, if one cannot expect any marginal returns of accumulated efforts, the sales manager must provide commissions on the high volume of sales at each period, to facilitate a high effort of a salesforce at earlier periods. Our paper provides important implications about dynamics in the compensation plan, which has not been addressed in the past studies but has frequently been witnessed in practice.
I. Introduction
The compensation for labor force has been a central focus of researchers in many fields, and a particular attention has been paid to understand heterogeneity across salesforce and firms using different research approaches. For example, Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin[1] focus on the differences in likely behaviors of the salesperson across firms to examine the presence of heterogeneous types of compensation plans using an agency theory framework. In contrast, Lal and Staelin[2] and Rao [3] address salesforce heterogeneity and information asymmetry to find the optimal compensation scheme. The studies on the salesforce compensation have not been limited to the salary-commission structure [4] [5] [6] [7] , and empirical and experimental evidence have been provided to support the theoretical findings [8] [9] [10] [11] .
Yet little effort has been made to explain about a phenomenon where the structure of the compensation plan for a single salesperson may vary as he/she gains experience. The absence of such studies is particularly interesting in that it is frequently witnessed that the salesforce compensation plan depends solely on the base salary for a certain period of time at the beginning of a salesperson's career.
The structure of the salesforce compensation, then, turns to the usual compensation scheme, such as combined salary and commissions or quota-based compensation plan.
One explanation for such dynamics in the compensation scheme structure can be the training for new salespeople, in that they may need training on their new tasks and therefore they cannot expect to receive commissions during the training. This argument is intuitive for a salesperson at a retail store for frequently purchased goods, where this period is a relatively short term. However, it does not give a sufficient explanation for the case of durable goods, in which such period is relatively long and salesperson often start engaging in sales before the period ends. Under this restriction, conventional wisdom suggests that the salespersons do not have motivation for the sales without commissions during this period, and the expected outcome level for a new salesperson is consequently low. Building on this notion, we attempt to address the dynamics in salesforce compensation structure by considering the accumulated efforts level of a salesperson.
Human capital accumulation through learning and experience has been widely studied. However, surprisingly few studies in the agency literature have addressed this question in studying the salesforce compensation. This is because the optimal contract plan in a repeated moral hazard model becomes quickly intractable as the number of periods increases even when an agent's performance depends upon his/her current effort [12] . However, one need to note that a distinctive feature of accumulated human capital that current effort not only affects the agents' current outcome but also determines their future productivity, in designing the optimal salesforce compensation. Given this recognition of accumulated human capital, we take a look at the problem of experience accumulated by a salesperson's efforts and convergence of a salesperson's productivity for a given present effort level. The emphasis is made on developing a theory, based on standard agency model, which explains the dynamics in the compensation plan structure within and across industries.
The intuition behind this result is following: we assume that there are diminishing marginal returns to the accumulated efforts. Until the marginal returns of accumulated efforts are sufficient, in order to induce high an effort of a salesperson, a sales manager only need to promise the adequate amounts of commissions at the end of the last period. However, the amounts of the commissions at the last period are far less than the sum of the direct commissions.
Because high effort increases salesperson's productivity and increases the probability of winning commissions at the last period, a salesforce will make a high effort, without any explicit commissions in any previous periods.
In particular, this result predicts that a salesperson will make an effort at every period early in his/her career without any commissions in order to gain experience. However, if one cannot expect any
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marginal returns of accumulated efforts, the sales manager must provide commissions on the high volume of sales at each period, to facilitate a high effort of a salesforce at earlier periods. In order to consider the zero marginal returns of the accumulated efforts, we make an emphasis upon that the probability of a high outcome is dependent both on the experience of a salesperson (e.g. accumulated effort) and on the effort at the present period. Ⅱ. Model
Assumption and Notation
The sales environment consists of a sales manager and a salesforce. The sales manager is the principal and the salespersons are agents in conventional principal agent problems. The risk-neutral sales manager designs the compensation scheme, which the risk-averse agents take as given and the agents' actions affect the outcome as well as the actual compensation received by them. Additionally, the sales manager understands the salesperson does what is best for him/herself, given the compensation plan.
The sales manager's problem is therefore to design a scheme which maximizes the firm's profits and the salesperson's problem is to maximize his/her utility. We first consider only the case where Pk+1,i > Pk,i holds, and furthermore, for simplicity, we assume the property of homogeneity in ability of a salesfoce.
However, later we will discuss the case where Pk+1,i = Pk,i as a salesperson gains the sufficient experience.
We will also incorporate the heterogeneity in ability of a salesforce under information symmetry and asymmetry between a salesforce and a sales manager.
Basic Model

One Period Case
In order to solve the optimal salesforce compensation plan, we initially consider a one-period model where the problem is identical to that in the standard agency model. Suppose that the salesperson's experience level is k -1 at the beginning of the period. In the one -period case, a salesforce compensation plan will take the following form: C = (u1, u2), where uj is the utility payment for the outcome, yj (j= 1, 2). In order to maximize the profit, a sales manager wants to induce an effort; a sales manager solves the following cost minimization problem subject to the two constraints. subject to
(
The first constraint is the participation constraint and implies that conditional on the current effort for given experience level k -1, the expected utility of a salesperson is greater than reservation utility m. The second constraint is the incentive constraint that implies for given experience level k -1, the expected utility with an effort at current period is larger than the expected utility without an effort at the current period. The solution of the cost maximization problem subject to the participation constraint and incentive constraint is
where the difference between two utility payments is
. This optimal compensation plan will be valid only if the profit of a firm is higher with higher level of salesperson's effort, and otherwise, the optimal compensation scheme will be (u Because we are interested only in the case where a higher level of efforts of salesforce helps to realize higher profits of the firm, we assume that the following condition always holds.
This assumption ensures that the optimal salesforce compensation level in one-period case will be given by (4).
Two Periods Case
Now suppose there are two periods in one accounting period and the marginal returns of accumulated efforts are positive. Therefore, the probability distribution of the sales at the second period is dependant on the salesperson's effort at the first period. As an effort made by a salesperson increases the probability of a high outcome, the sales
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manager's optimal choice is to induce an effort in every period. For simplicity, we let m = 0 and the salesperson's accumulated efforts, k = 0 without loss of generality.
Also we let yj and y1 represent the outcome at the first and the second period, respectively, and we denote ujl as the second period utility payment when the first period outcome is yj and the second period outcome is y1. As in one-period model, the optimal salesforce compensation will be the solution to the cost minimization problem subject to the participation and incentive constraints.
If a salesperson makes efforts in both periods as the sales manager intends, the salesperson's experience level will be one at the end of the first period and salesperson will realize a high outcome with probability P0,1. His/her experience level at the end of the second period will be two and he/she then will gain a high outcome with probability P1,1. The sales manager now has a cost minimization problem subject to a participation constraint and two incentive constraints.
The first constraint is the participation constraint.
The second-constraint is the first-period incentive constraint given that second period constraint is satisfied, and third constraints is the second-period incentive constraint given that the salesperson has made an effort in the first period. To explain how the first period constraint is characterized by above, we now adopt the following lemma proven by Kwon[14] .
Lemma 1. In each period t, if the incentive constraint holds for a salesperson with accumulated effort level k, the incentive constraint also holds for a salesperson with accumulated effort level k', for all
Proof. Suppose the incentive constraint holds for a salesperson with initial accumulated effort level k. In order to solve the cost minimization problem, we will follow the steps shown by Kwon[14] . We first ignore the first period incentive constraint (8) and
show that the solution of the relaxed problem still satisfies the first-period incentive constraint (8) . In other words, with constraints (7) and (9) only, the constraint (8) will be binding as in the one-period case. From the binding second-period incentive constraint (9), we have uj2
We can then write
where ω
] as proven at (4) . By substituting these optimal payments into our objective function, we can solve the cost minimization problem subject to the participation constraint (7) . 
For simplicity, we now denote u ≡ u1 = u2, and m2
The participation constraint provides the condition, u = V(1) -m2 and finally, m2 is determined by the first order condition,
Moreover, we have, from the second period and participation constraints,
(1 -P0,1) u
and these conditions verify that the first incentive constraint is binding with equality.
If a salesperson has made an effort at his/her first period, his/her expected utility in the second period will be (1 -P1,1) u*1 + P1,1 u*2 -V(1) and otherwise, it will be (1 -P0,1) u*1 + P0,1 u*2 -V(1).
Furthermore, because the second period incentive constraint is binding with equality, the difference of these expected utilities is V(1), which is exactly the same as the disutility from making an effort.
Therefore, the salesperson will make an effort at the first period without direct commissions at the first period and the commissions for the second period will be V(1) / [P1,1 -P1,0]. Furthermore, the commissions provided at the last period induce an effort at the first period as well as the second period and are much less than the sum of the direct commissions at the first and second period.
Two Periods Case
At the beginning, we have introduced a constraint that induces a salesperson to make an effort with k -1 level of accumulated efforts. From this, in order to motivate an effort at the period N, Commissions only at the end of the last period is provided to a salesforce and is optimal compensation plan.
The optimal compensation plan is exactly the same as the result achieved by Kwon [12] . The result implies that it is not necessary for the sales manager to offer direct commissions to encourage a salesperson to make an effort at any previous periods.
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In addition, the manager does not backload the commissions on the last period but the only commissions for the last period are enough to induce an effort at the last period.
These properties provide an explanation to some empirical facts that the incentives are provided in the last period and are dependent only on the outcome of the last period. As exampled by Kwon[14] , the graduate programs in many universities do not promote students to their thesis stage if they fail qualification test taken at the end of the course work.
Analysis
Convergence of a High Outcome Probability
From the cost minimization problem of the sales manager subject to the incentive and participation constraints, we have shown no need of explicit commissions in order to induce an effort of a salesperson at each stage. However, we note that under the property of the diminishing marginal returns of the accumulated effort level, the probability of a high outcome for a given effort level at the present period possibly converges to a certain stage.
In other words, there possibly exists an experience level from which greater accumulated efforts do not raise the probability of a high outcome for a given level of present effort; the approach of accumulated effort level to such an experience level will disallow future productivity to depend on the decision of an effort at the present stage.
We denote the minimum number of efforts to achieve the sufficient experience level by η and write the probability of a high outcome as Pk+1,i = Pk,i for all k ≥ η.
For example, when only a limited number of skills are required for a given job, the current effort of an agent with all required skills will not affect his/her performance in the next period. In addition when the required skills for the task remain unchanged, the necessary training period will not be infinite and moreover, especially when the given task for an agent is relatively simple, the period that an agent takes to reach the sufficient experience level will be relatively short. Therefore, from considering that the skills required for a salesperson are constant and not excessive, we infer that the present outcome of a salesforce then depends solely on the present effort of the salesperson if his/her accumulated experience level is sufficient: i.e. k ≥ η. This is from that the accumulated effort level from the previous periods and an effort level at present period determine the probability distribution for a high outcome.
We now solve the cost minimization problem subject to the participation constraint and the incentive constraint under the property of Pk+1,i = Pk,i to consider the case where k ≥ η. As we have shown earlier, suppose initially that one period is in one accounting period. The sales manager then has the same cost minimization problem subject to the same two constraints, which can be written as the following.
subject to
We have already shown that two constraints are binding as the objective function and two constraints are exactly identical to that of one period game.
Consequently, the solution is identical to the earlier result as well:
Now we consider the two period case, where two periods are in one accounting period. The objective function and the incentive and participation constraints are also the same and can be written as the following.
When k < η, in order to obtain the solution for the cost minimization problem of sales manager subject to three constraints, we have shown that the first period incentive is binding at the last step while initially ignoring it. However, we now simplify the first period incentive constraint at our first step and we achieve
(24) (24) implies that the compensation for a high outcome at the first period is larger than the one for a low outcome at the first period at least by V(1) / [P η,1 -P η,0]. This result is conflicting with the earlier result as we expected. Furthermore, the solution for optimal commissions for the second period is 
Heterogeneity in a Saleforce
As discussed by Lal and Staelin[2] and Rao [3] , salespeople are possibly heterogeneous in their sales abilities and learning speeds. We initially suppose that salespeople are heterogeneous only in their learning speed but later in next section, we will discuss heterogeneity in salespersons' sales abilities. We now assume that a salesforce consists of two types of salespersons: fast-learning salespersons and slowlearning salespersons; we denote fast-learning salespersons as f and slow-learning salespersons as l.
In addition, the sales manager does not identify the salesperson's type, but the salesperson observes his/her own type. Therefore, a type f salesperson takes a relatively short period to achieve sufficient skills/experience and a type l salesperson takes comparatively long term to gain the same skills/experience. Thus we write ηf < ηl where ηf
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represents the minimum number of efforts required for a fast-learning salesperson to achieve sufficient skills/experience, and ηl characterizes the minimum number of efforts necessary for a slow-learning salesperson to be proficient. Finally, we assume that the sales manager holds a fair expectation on ηf, and ηl from his/her experience.
In order to minimize the cost, the sales manager The sales manager then has two cost minimization functions subject to two constraints as follows.
(1 -P k,1
(1 -P η,1
The objective functions (26) and (29) are cost minimization problems of a sales manager for a slow-learning salesperson and for a fast-learning salesperson, respectively and two constraints for each objective function are the participation and incentive constraints. We have seen exactly the same problems and constraints when we solve the cost minimization function for one period case, and we know the optimal compensation plan for each salesperson is ( u
Furthermore, the above optimal solution satisfies the two conditions below,
in order that each type of salesperson will be better off with the salesforce compensation plan designed for him/herself given that a salesperson makes an effort.
This shows that a manager should employ a menu of compensation plans that is implemented by announcing a payment for a low outcome, and a commission rate for compensating a high outcome for each type of a salesperson. The announcement is made prior to the period ηf, and the salesperson is asked to choose a type from the menu to maximize his/her utility at the same time. Thereafter, both types of salespersons will make efforts without any direct commissions until the period ηl, and a sales manager only provides a commission at the period ηf to induce an effort for every salesperson. The salesforce compensation scheme then turns to a set of two contracts during the period t' ∈[ηf, ηl), and afterwards, a single compensation plan will be provided for both types of salespersons.
On the other hand, we note that the payment to the salesforce is a function of probability where the probability continues to vary every period. This variation in probability then must result in the changes in the commissions to a high outcome at every period during t' ∈[ηf, ηl), but we hardly see this type of the compensation plan in practice. The discrepancy between our model and the practice can be explained as follows: in our model, we do not consider the management cost from changing the payment plan for simplicity. However, managing the compensation plan is not costless in the real world and the difference between ηf and ηl is possibly trivial. In other words, a firm can be often better off by not changing the payment plan too frequently due to the management cost.
Discussion
In our paper, the optimal salesforce compensation plan is proven to vary with the accumulated efforts of the salesperson as we see in practice, and under the heterogeneity in the learning speed, a sales manager's optimal compensation plan includes a menu of contracts that are designed for different types of 
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the problem of designing [2] R. Lal and R. Staelin, "Salesforce Compensation
